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Abstract  
Purpose: In an attempt to build upon existing theory, this paper investigates the potentially 
reciprocal relationship between negotiation and strategy, and strives to contribute towards a 
better understanding of the ways in which organizations negotiate.  
Design/methodology/approach: Built upon the integration of two different bodies of 
literature, negotiation and strategy, and on the analysis of the case of Ryanair, this paper argues 
for an integrated approach to negotiation and organizational capabilities.  
Findings: The case study allows for a clearer understanding of how negotiation capability can 
play a significant role in supporting the creation and sustainment of competitive advantage, 
even under unfavorable industry settings.  
Originality/value: The paper contributes to theoretical development by offering new and 
insightful explanations of firms’ behavior, moving beyond the classic interpretation of industry 
dynamics, such as bargaining power. This study has implications for both practice and research, 
as it offers a better and more holistic understanding of the strategy making process and the 
foundations of its success. 
 
Keywords: Negotiation, Knowledge Management, Capabilities, Ryanair, Strategy, Theory 
Building 
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Building Theory on the Negotiation Capability of the Firm: Evidence from Ryanair 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Research Background and Gaps 
The network of negotiations taking place across an organization contributes strongly to 
the success of the overall strategy of the firm; in other words: “organizations that look past 
negotiation as a core capability do so at their own peril” (Movius and Susskind, 2009, p. 5). 
This blunt statement from two leading negotiation scholars calls for an organization-wide, 
strategic perspective on negotiation practices. With this paper, we intend to respond to this call 
by adopting a theory building approach (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) in order to investigate 
the ways in which negotiation, seen as an organizational capability rather than an individual 
capability, relates to and contributes to competitive advantage. As our literature review will 
demonstrate, such issues have been widely overlooked in research, with strategy merely 
acknowledging the negotiation activities within an organization and identifying the concept of 
bargaining power in a market (Moatti et al., 2014); negotiation focusing only on an individual 
level (Ogliastri and Quintanilla, 2016); and only the stakeholder theory stream of literature 
calling for a systemic perspective which, unfortunately, does not examine negotiations in any 
depth (Ackermann and Eden, 2011). Consequently, a systematic understanding of the ways 
that negotiation can contribute to competitive advantage, beyond the mere acknowledgement 
of the fact that it does, is still missing in both negotiation and strategy literature. This issue is 
partly a result of the silence within scholarly literature on how negotiation knowledge is 
created, stored, and shared within organizations (e.g., Nadler et al., 2003). By integrating these 
two bodies of literature (negotiation and strategy) and unveiling a case study, we aim to give 
academic recognition to negotiation as an organizational capability, opening up a new field of 
research in an attempt to provide new insight into how firms can better their chances of survival 
in today’s turbulent times. 
Following Movius and Susskind (2009), we adopt a broad definition of negotiation 
which is inclusive of all joint decision-making processes, in which managers and leaders must 
reach agreements with the organization’s stakeholders. Unlike other scholars, we do not 
consider negotiations to be unique occurrences; for instance, negotiation with a supplier for 
specific maintenance services, or a single event in the history of an organization, even if of 
strategic importance (Ring and van de Ven, 1994). Rather, we approach it as the entirety of the 
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organization’s negotiated relationships, both internal – individual and collective employment 
negotiations, interpersonal and interdepartmental relations, etc. – and external – sales, 
purchasing, lobbying, etc. For the purpose of this study, we also deliberately choose not to 
adhere to a specific theoretical view of strategy in light of the nascence of our topic of research, 
as will be demonstrated in the paper. 
1.2 Research Aims and Value 
The aim of this paper is to lay the foundations for the development of a comprehensive 
and scientific understanding of the intricate relationship between a firm’s strategy and its 
capability to succeed in negotiating productive internal and external relationships. Our research 
contributes to the theoretical development of negotiation as an organizational capability and 
strives to demonstrate that, through negotiation, some firms (such as Ryanair) may achieve a 
superior and counterintuitive competitive advantage, despite unfavorable external conditions 
and, in theory, a disadvantage of bargaining power. Our study proposes a model that shows a 
potentially reciprocal relationship between strategy and negotiation, as negotiation practices 
are influenced by an organization’s strategy and thus play a large role in strategy making, 
leading to competitive advantage. 
Given the limited theoretical resources available and the novelty of our approach, we 
contribute to these bodies of literature by inductively investigating a case study analysis that 
will serve to build theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2014). Consistently with 
previous research (e.g., Stary, 2014), we rely on a single case, namely the airline firm Ryanair, 
as it exemplifies the ways in which an idiosyncratic and structured corporate approach to the 
management of knowledge around negotiations can be central to a firm’s strategy and form the 
basis of its competitive advantage. 
The paper is structured as follows: we initially review the scarce amount of literature in 
this area in order to demonstrate that this topic, which appears to be of pivotal importance from 
the perspective of managers and practitioners, has been under-researched so far; secondly, we 
present the research design and the case; and, finally, we construct theory, filling the gap 
between negotiation and strategy and subsequently providing suggestions on how to maximize 
the contribution of negotiation to aid in the success of a strategy.  
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2. Literature review: the gap at the interplay of strategy and negotiation 
We reviewed the two relevant streams of literature - one in strategy and one in 
negotiation - to try to outline the contributions and limitations of the current academic 
knowledge on negotiation as an organizational capability and its interplay with strategy. In 
doing so, we stumbled upon a bulk of references relating to questions that did not entirely 
correlate with our investigations but were interesting nontheless; for example, the industrial 
economics perspective on bargaining power (Kim, 1988; Michael, 2000; Moatti et al., 2014). 
Other contributions focused on specific types of negotiations that can have strategic importance 
for an organization, such as exchanges between headquarters and subsidiaries (Dörrenbächer 
and Gammelgaard, 2006) or negotiations with governments (Weiss, 1990). The  majority of 
the investigated literature concerned collaborative forms of strategy, such as mergers and 
acquisitions (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Walsh and Fahey, 1986; Dierickx and  Koza, 1991), 
joint ventures (Brouthers and Bamossy, 1997; Lee, Chen, and Kao, 1998; Luo, 1999; Yan and 
Gray, 2001; Luo and Shenkar, 2002), or strategic alliances and outsourcing (Lippman and 
Rumelt, 2003). Taken together, these papers acknowledge the fact that specific strategic moves 
take place through high-level negotiations (Ring and van de Ven, 1994). For example, research 
on acquisitions remains controversial in terms of the reasons why well-designed acquisition 
processes fail (Kummer and Steger, 2008); on this subject, strategic fit cannot be considered to 
be the only variable (Porter, 1996). The process of negotiating the acquisition and integrating 
the target into the parent firm, another setting for multiple negotiations, should also be 
considered as one of the drivers of success (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Dierickx and Koza, 
1991). Similarly, research on joint ventures shows different patterns in organizations’ 
behaviors, particularly with regards to contract negotiations (Lee et al., 1998; ; Luo, 1999; Luo 
and Shenkar, 2002).  
A broader perspective on negotiation is taken by only a few strategy scholars. Pahl and 
Roth (1993) identify some key variables in strategy formation that may impact conflict-
proneness and negotiation practices between headquarters and foreign subsidiaries; similarly, 
it has been posited that the level of centralization of some strategic decisions produces a 
structured and idiosyncratic way of negotiating throughout the organization (Quélin and 
Duhamel, 2003). 
A different stream of research looks at the interplay between conflict and strategy. 
Firstly, conflict within strategy-making teams may hinder strategy formulation (Elbanna et al., 
2011; Parayitam and Dooley, 2011). Secondly, well-designed strategic moves may backfire at 
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the implementation stage simply because of failed human interactions further down the line 
(Mintzberg et al., 1998). Jemison and Sitkin (1986), while studying the acquisition process as 
a determinant of acquisition activities and outcomes, advocate the importance of negotiating 
practices in the acquisition process with reference to the success of the operation - particularly 
the acceptance of the operation by the personnel (Beatty and Schneier, 1997). Indeed, lack of 
transitional support may result in dissatisfaction and low productivity (Jemison and Sitkin, 
1986). 
Further literature examines the ways in which negotiation behavior may specifically 
impact strategy implementation. In this respect, one should immediately think of stakeholder 
theory (Freeman, 2010). On the one hand, this theory states the problem, that is: to be 
successful, an organization has to negotiate productive relationships with key stakeholders 
(Brouthers and Bamossy, 1997; Freeman, 2010; Mintzberg and Lampel, 2012). On the other 
hand, it neglects to focus on how one should pursue such an objective on an everyday basis, 
leaving such questions mostly to the field of negotiation (Lax and Sebenius, 1986). Here, 
beyond stakeholder management, the question becomes whether there are negotiation 
practices, tailored to a given strategic positioning, which favor, or conversely hinder, the 
successful implementation of one’s strategy.  
The reviewed literature rarely considers negotiation from a systematic, organization-
wide perspective that covers all of its forms - from sales and purchasing to everyday 
management negotiations - and addresses their relation to strategy. This may be a consequence 
of the fact that the different approaches taken by the two bodies of literature (strategy and 
negotiation) have thus far somehow prevented cross-fertilization. Negotiation research has 
focused mostly on the behavioral aspects of human interactions (Lewicki et al., 2014) and 
ignored the contextual aspects of such interactions, which only seem to be addressed in political 
science literature (Zartman, 1977, 1988) and, more recently, in employment relationship 
literature (Munduate et al., 2012). Conversely, strategic literature looks at stakeholder 
management without clearly entering into the specificities of how these relationships are 
established, maintained, and improved when needed (Ackermann and Eden, 2011; Mazzola 
and Kellermanns, 2010). Taken together, these bodies of literature leave a gap in our 
understanding of how organizations function when negotiating and, more specifically, how 
strategy and negotiation processes are intertwined. 
Even if the literature on strategy, taken in its entirety, seems to infer the existence of 
the relationship between negotiation and strategy, it does not provide a holistic, general 
framework to help us to understand how such an intricate relationship actually develops. 
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However, as demonstrated by our case study, opportunities arise from the possible integration 
of negotiation concepts into the study of strategy. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Justification for the theory building approach 
This study adopts a theory building approach which “is a research strategy that involves 
using one or more cases to create theoretical constructs, propositions and/or midrange theory 
from case-based, empirical evidence” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, p. 25). The case study 
method (Yin, 2014) has increasingly received attention from management scholars over recent 
decades and has been widely used in the fields of management and strategy (Lin et al., 2015; 
Manzini et al., 2016; Salvato, 2009). Theory building through a case study is especially 
appropriate in new topic areas as a result of its likelihood of generating novel theory in an 
empirically valid manner (Eisenhardt, 1989). The justification for our use of the case study 
method in our research can be found directly in Eisenhardt’s words: “there are times when little 
is known about a phenomenon, current perspectives seem inadequate because they have little 
empirical substantiation, or they conflict with each other or common sense. Or, sometimes, 
serendipitous findings in a theory-testing study suggest the need for a new perspective. In these 
situations, theory building from case study research is particularly appropriate because theory 
building from case studies does not rely on previous literature or prior empirical evidence” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 532). The methodology allows for the investigation of a topic as a distinct 
“experiment”, without isolating the phenomena from the context as it emphasizes “the rich, 
real-world context in which the phenomena occur” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, p. 25). 
Adopting a theory building methodology based on a case study allowed for cross-comparisons 
and the triangulation of data gathered from multiple secondary sources, such as reports, 
magazines, and newspapers. 
Our emphasis in this study is on inductively developing a new theoretical approach. 
The concept of negotiation as an organizational capability may sound quite obvious from a 
managerial and practical perspective, however management research is yet to develop theory 
around the construct. It is almost trivial to say that a firm that negotiates better than their 
competitors has a competitive advantage. Yet, again, existing theory does not provide a sound 
review of the ways in which negotiation can be investigated at the organizational level, i.e. 
what it means for a firm to negotiate more effectively, how a firm can systematically improve 
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its negotiations (beyond training its key actors), and how to fully grasp the relationship between 
negotiation and strategy.  
3.2.  Case study selection 
We base our paper on a single case, a method seemingly consistent with the novelty of 
the researched topic and its accessibility, as we aim  to richly describe the existence of a 
phenomenon (Siggelkow, 2007; Urbinati et al., 2018). Our case was selected through 
theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) and Ryanair was chosen because of its 
suitability in illuminating the relationship between the firm’s idiosyncratic organizational 
capability to negotiate and their leadership position on the ultra-competitive European airline 
market (Kangis and O’Reilly, 2003). 
 More specifically, Ryanair was selected firstly because the airline sector offers a wide 
and deep range of publicly available sources, due to its regulatory components; and it has been 
extensively studied in the field of strategy, proving its relevance to the topic (e.g., Shakun, 
1991; Smith, Grimm, Gannon, and Chen, 1991; Porter, 1996; Grant, 2010). Ryanair has been 
utilized in the past in investigations concerning various strategic issues, such as strategy in 
dynamic markets (Kangis and O’Reilly, 2003), business models (Casadesus-Masanell and 
Ricart, 2010), and company positioning (Lawton, 1999). It remains that none of these cases 
empirically examine the ways in which Ryanair’s standardized negotiation approach across its 
main stakeholder relationships has contributed to its success. On the contrary, we claim that 
most, if not all, of the cases written about Ryanair provide only a partial explanation for its 
success: while they unveil their cost-cutting strategy, they do not investigate how such deficits 
are achieved in practice. Finally, in addition to the numerous cases and articles on Ryanair, as 
well as public complaints and legal proceedings, the company voluntarily discloses plenty of 
information to the public, including content pertaining to negotiations, which would often be 
considered confidential elsewhere. This allows us, in a similar fashion to antecedent studies 
(Urbinati et al., 2018), to reconstruct in hindsight the institutionalization of their negotiation 
capability. In summary, we have chosen to present the Ryanair case study to support our 
enquiry because the airline is a good example of a firm that shows a unique and idiosyncratic 
way of addressing relationships with their stakeholders and exhibits an unambiguous 
relationship between its negotiation practices and performance. 
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3.3. Data collection and analysis procedure 
Theory building through case studies offers a wide variety of data collection options, 
mostly based on the availability of data for the researcher for the purpose of analysis 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). For various reasons, we chose to rely on archival data and 
not to interview individuals who were working at Ryanair or were involved in negotiating with 
Ryanair. Firstly, as discussed, many sources relating to the company already exist both in the 
form of teaching materials and academic publications; there is therefore already a large amount 
of available information, and thus a serious risk of irrelevance. Secondly, Ryanair has a 
tendency not to cooperate and to circulate false information about its practices. We were 
therefore unsure as to whether or not we would be able to obtain direct data and, if we were to 
obtain it, whether we would be able to trust it. Thirdly, we are dealing here with a hidden source 
of competitive advantage, some form of trade secret, which makes the subject highly sensitive. 
 To ensure cross-comparison and triangulation, we collected data and information about 
negotiations in which Ryanair was involved from multiple published sources. In particular, we 
conducted a longitudinal analysis of articles published by relevant economic and aviation 
journals. Although the research took place between 2013 and 2017, investigated articles traced 
back to the early 2000s. In addition to this, we reviewed a large number of publicly available 
reports, legal proceedings, press releases, media reports, company statements, and airline 
reference websites, such as planespotters.net and flightglobal.com. Moreover, the researchers 
analyzed the large number of available interviews and public statements of Ryanair’s CEO, 
Michael O’Leary (available on YouTube). Finally, we reviewed existing academic literature 
concerning Ryanair in the form of research articles (Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010; 
Kangis and O’Reilly, 2003; Lawton, 1999) and teaching case studies (notably from the Harvard 
Business Cases and The Case Centre; e.g., Borbély, 2014). Our analysis covered data both 
from Ryanair and from the stakeholders at large, e.g. unions, government agencies, and 
suppliers who negotiated with them. After having collected data and information, we conducted 
a content analysis (Weber, 1990), targeting the negotiation behavior of Ryanair. 
Following established research techniques (Urbinati et al., 2018), we followed two 
specific steps to analyze secondary sources. To begin with, each author independently 
conducted a content analysis, applying within-case and cross-case explanation procedures. 
Each author then juxtaposed his own interpretation of the facts with the other authors, and a 
shared understanding and interpretation was reached. Authors then conducted conversations 
with a panel of experts in the field of negotiation, aviation, law, and strategic management, to 
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discuss and corroborate the findings of the content analysis. The panel consisted of seven 
professors of either Strategy, Law, or Negotiation with world-class leading profiles (two from 
UCLA Anderson School of Management, one from IESEG School of Management, one from 
Monash Business School, one from Fisher College of Business, one from Marquette 
University, and one from Cleveland State University) along with a number of consultants and 
academics attending meetings of the International Association for Conflict Management and 
the Academy of Management, who participated in sessions where earlier versions of this 
research were presented. Each author subsequently conducted informal conversations and 
observations while flying with Ryanair and other airlines to corroborate previous findings. 
Finally, we triangulated the findings from each step to develop the case study.  
 
4. Case study: Ryanair 
4.1. Introduction 
Low-cost carriers are specific airlines that offer limited services, most of them only 
medium-haul routes with no connections (Button, 2012). They keep their costs as low as 
possible and, at the same time, offer as many city pairs as possible in order to satisfy the 
maximum amount of customers. This means keeping planes flying for more hours per day, 
offering limited services onboard, having their personnel fly more than their competitors’ for 
lower wages, and reducing the fees paid to airports (Hunter, 2006). To be as economical as 
possible, they must fit more passengers on every flight and, as such, they do not offer an upper 
class (which uses lots of floor space) and their fares are calculated to maximize seat occupancy 
(Button, 2012). 
Ryanair operates a low fare, scheduled passenger service on short-haul and point-to-
point routes between Ireland, the United Kingdom, Continental Europe, and Morocco. The 
company's fleet consists of more than 300 Boeing 737-800 aircraft, each equipped with 189 
seats, the maximum allowed. The company offers over 1,600 flights per day, serving 
approximately 190 airports across Europe (Ryanair, 2016). Ryanair is actually a recent venture: 
it was founded in 1985 as a one-route operator between South-Eastern Ireland and London. 
After a rather bumpy start, it repositioned itself in the early 1990s and later took full advantage 
of the 1997 deregulation of the EU airspace, under which any European airline could fly out of 
any point in Europe, even if not located in their home country. Since then, Ryanair has 
experienced incredible growth, despite the global downturn in air travel following the terrorist 
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attack on the World Trade Center in 2001. Although a market leader today, Ryanair aims to 
keep growing to fly a staggering 200 million passengers in the next ten years in comparison to 
circa 120 million passengers today. This would make it by far the largest air carrier in Europe 
(O’Leary, 2015). 
It is important to understand that the airline industry scores reputably low in overall 
profitability (Smith et al., 1991; Morrison and Winston, 1995; Oum, Park, Kim, and Yu, 2004; 
Porter, 2008; Grant, 2010). When looking at the European market, most classical “flagship” 
airlines (notably Air France-KLM, IAG [British Airways and Iberia], and Lufthansa) struggle 
to break even. Ryanair is not only one of the rare financially healthy airlines, but also reports 
impressive financial results year after year (Ryanair posted a yearly profit of 866 million Euros 
in 2015), which is paradoxical considering their ultra-low cost pricing policy. In other words, 
how can an airline apply the lowest fares and be so profitable in such an unprofitable market? 
4.2. Pushing the no-frills logic a few steps further 
Ryanair’s success has been widely investigated and most reasons justifying its success 
concern its industrial and marketing nature, focusing on Ryanair’s cost structure and customer-
value appropriation strategies (Lawton, 1999; Kangis and O’Reilly, 2003; Casadesus-Masanell 
and Ricart, 2010). Beyond these explanations, we believe that at the core of Ryanair’s success 
lies a structured use of market dominance through negotiation to capture value across the board, 
not only with customers and employees, but first and foremost with airport operators and 
aircraft manufacturers. As demonstrated in the next section, the latter two categories 
supposedly hold market power over airlines due to the scarcity of the resources they offer 
(Porter, 2008). 
With its customers and personnel, Ryanair applies a full ‘no-frills’ strategy. It has been 
able to impose very strict conditions on its pilots and stewards, even banning them from 
unionizing: wages are low and social coverage minimal (most employees being subject to the 
liberal Irish law). As it is one of the only airlines currently recruiting highly sought-after 
positions (cabin crews, pilots, etc.), Ryanair openly applies a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ negotiation 
strategy with its personnel (Arnoux, 2013).  
Quote 1: On June 19, 2009, BALPA (the U.K. pilots union) made a request for voluntary 
recognition under applicable U.K. legislation, which Ryanair rejected. (Ryanair, 2016) 
Similarly, passengers pay for flying from point A to point B, nothing else: printing a 
boarding pass at the airport, checking luggage, or getting food onboard is possible but 
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everything comes at a high price. Customer service is reduced to a bare minimum and after-
sales service almost non-existent. Historically, fares could only be booked through the airline’s 
website; only recently could travel agencies book Ryanair flights for their clients, and even this 
is under the best possible conditions for the airline as travel agencies cannot collect commission 
on these tickets. 
Quote 2: Ryanair has negotiated an attractive per segment price and expects to sell tickets via 
travel agents at no commission to a mix of largely business/corporate travelers. (Ryanair, 
2016)  
In addition to applying sheer market power, which derives from resource scarcity, to 
restrict or, when possible, even eliminate their counterparts’ negotiation margin, Ryanair has 
proven able to negotiate extremely advantageous deals like no one else in the market. While 
capturing the most financial value through these agreements, Ryanair still offers enough non-
financial benefits to its stakeholders to make these deals possible. Indeed, both jobs at airlines 
and cheap airfares being rare resources on the market, they come at a high cost for isolated 
stakeholders that are unable to, or are prevented from, uniting. 
Nothing thus far seems particularly novel: the firm uses its power over weaker 
stakeholders to gain value. Many firms adapt their recruitment, purchasing, and/or sales 
practices to their position on respective markets. The case of Ryanair is particularly worthy of 
interest because of the similarities between all of their organizational negotiation behaviors, 
revealing the existence of an underlying negotiation approach which is fully aligned with their 
positioning and strategic objectives - one that they use in most, if not all, of their stakeholder 
relationships. In other words, Ryanair uses consistent negotiation strategies not only against 
weak stakeholders, but also against more powerful ones, namely airports and aircraft 
manufacturers. In the next section, we cast a closer look at these two negotiation settings. 
4.3. Ryanair’s special negotiation ingredient 
To use an airport, airlines usually pay landing fees (part service, part tax), plus variable 
fees depending on the services they use (time spent on the ground, gates, ground crews, 
maintenance, etc.). These fees are usually ultimately transferred to the airfare paid by the 
customers. To reduce these, Ryanair relies heavily on second-tier regional airports, whose 
operators are often in a weaker spot: they have invested a lot with little prospect of profitability 
and they are therefore eager to secure service from a major airline. When a platform like 
London Heathrow, used by major airlines, is saturated, landing rights are traded at high costs, 
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which makes it a sellers’ market. Conversely, Treviso (in Italy) or Vatry (in France) may be 
dying for a scheduled service by a major airline - a buyers’ market in this case (Frazier and 
Kale, 1989; Taylor, 1995). 
Quote 3: Ryanair’s future growth also materially depends on its ability to access suitable 
airports located in its targeted geographic markets at costs that are consistent with Ryanair’s 
strategy. (Ryanair, 2016) 
Taking this into account, Ryanair has proven able not only to secure very low landing 
fees from regional airports, but also to collect ‘marketing fees’ from them. In other words, the 
airports operators pay Ryanair to serve their platforms, compensating, at least in part, the 
landing fees that the airline pays. One such negotiation may not amount to much, but on a scale 
of 190 airports, they amounted to about 660 million euros in 2008, a sum greater than Ryanair’s 
profit that year (RFI, 2010). Furthermore, should an operator refuse to pay, or try to increase 
landing fees, Ryanair simply threatens to leave, even if still bound by a contract. This subject 
has been under several investigations carried out by the European Union and national courts in 
various States on the basis of public aid in disguise and alteration of fair competition (European 
Commission, 2014). 
Quote 4: For example, in July 2012, the Spanish government increased airport taxes at the 
two largest airports, Barcelona and Madrid, by over 100%, while smaller increases were 
implemented at other Spanish airports. As a result, Ryanair cancelled routes and reduced 
capacity on remaining routes from Madrid and Barcelona. (Ryanair, 2016) 
The explanation usually provided is that Ryanair chooses second-tier airports because 
it places them in the most powerful situation, where they can impose their conditions in the 
easiest manner (e.g., Button, 2012; Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010). Looking at this from 
a negotiation perspective enables us to unveil how this negotiation strategy is, in fact, more 
complex. Ryanair aims to capture a lot of financial value from these deals to support their cost-
cutting strategy. At the same time, Ryanair responds to lots of non-financial interests from their 
counterparts: service by a major airline, destinations, attractiveness for tourism, and business, 
as well as local jobs and political credit. In that sense, such deals are truly “win-win” (Lax and 
Sebenius, 1986) in that they are advantageous for both parties. This changes, of course, when 
Ryanair renegotiates or ends deals before their contractual termination date, arguing that local 
taxes are raised, or that their financial expectations are not being met. It remains that some 
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airports, such as Beauvais in France, have gained tremendously from dealing with Ryanair. For 
example, Ryanair constitutes 84.6% of the traffic for Stansted Airport (CAPA Centre for 
Aviation, 2016), whose growth in the last years has been almost entirely driven by Ryanair’s 
growth (The Manchester Airports Group, 2015). 
A similar argument that has been provided to explain Ryanair’s success is that the firm 
needs to have the lowest possible operating costs of their aircraft. A low-cost carrier will try to 
operate only one type of aircraft (the Boeing 737-800 in Ryanair’s case) to enjoy savings from 
“fleet commonality” (i.e. by using a single type of aircraft, planes become interchangeable, 
making operations easier and, furthermore, pilots and stewards are allowed to fly all aircraft 
without having additional training). Such a strategy places the manufacturer in a de facto 
monopolistic position. Because transferring to a competitor comes at a such a high price, the 
airline is captive which, in theory, puts the manufacturer in a very favorable position to drive 
prices up in their negotiations with airlines (Porter, 1980, 2008). 
To overcome this and reduce cost of ownership of their aircraft to the bare minimum, 
Ryanair must carefully play its relationship with Boeing. To do so, Ryanair has ordered planes 
in bulk at carefully chosen points in time. They placed major orders in 2003 (while the airline 
market was at an all-time low after the terrorist attacks of September 2001) and 2013-2014 
(while Boeing was struggling with the battery problems of its 787 Dreamliner). In other words, 
Ryanair balances power at the negotiation table by ordering airplanes when their counterpart 
is in desperate need of good news. They then enhance the relationship by participating, once 
the deal is signed, in multiple media campaigns explaining how great Boeing products are 
(O’Leary, 2013). Such cross-marketing is a cheap investment and provides Ryanair with 
indirect, free publicity. In addition to this, in order to avoid being totally captive with Boeing, 
Ryanair also discusses with Airbus and is collaborating in the launch of a competing product 
from the Chinese manufacturer COMAC (Michaels, 2011). 
These practices not only demonstrate the centrality of negotiation in Ryanair’s strategy 
and operations, but they also show that Ryanair uses an idiosyncratic negotiation approach in 
most, if not all, of its key stakeholder relationships. Many firms structure some of their 
negotiation practices but few make use of a similar negotiation approach across the board with 
all stakeholders, powerful or weak. Even fewer go so far as being able to reverse unfavorable 
power balance relationships like Ryanair does. This tends to show that mastering negotiation 
techniques, not only at an individual level, but also at an organizational level, is key to 
Ryanair’s success in an otherwise hostile environment.  
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Quote 5: One of the stated objectives of Ryanair’s strategic plan: Renegotiating contracts with 
existing suppliers, airports and handling companies. (Ryanair, 2016) 
Ryanair’s strategy to rule the market by offering ultra-low-fares to its customers, and 
to kill costs wherever possible cannot, alone, explain Ryanair’s success. This needs to be 
coupled with the implementation of a strong negotiation strategy across most, if not all, 
stakeholder relationships in such an efficient way that it loosens the competitive forces and 
creates profitability (e.g., Chang and Lin, 2015; Perez and Pablos, 2003).  
Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2010) offer an overall view of Ryanair’s business 
model. Figure 1 is based on their analysis; it helps identify the key strategic elements of 
negotiations for Ryanair’s success. Red circles and text represent our identification of 
Ryanair’s unique and idiosyncratic way of negotiating. For example, what Casadesus-Masanell 
and Ricart refer to as the choice of having a standardized fleet of Boeing 737s, leading to a 
bargaining power with suppliers and lower maintenance costs, is the result of a strategic 
negotiation, in which Ryanair would not have had power were it not for its exceptional 
negotiation capability. The figure shows the ways in which successful negotiations may bridge 
a firm’s strategic positioning through the success of its plan deployment. In the case of Ryanair, 
negotiation style is very aggressive on price, although it is respectful of the non-financial 
interests of their negotiation counterparts. We therefore posit that these negotiation practices 
contribute greatly to solving the paradox that exists between the airline’s ultra-low fares – 
Ryanair is by far the cheapest way to fly across Europe – and its ultra-high financial results. 
 
  
 16 
Figure 1 – Importance of Negotiations within Ryanair Business Model (adapted from  Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 
2010) 
 
 
5. Theory building: conceptual contributions from negotiation to strategy literature  
Looking at the Ryanair case specifically in terms of its negotiation practices enables us 
to identify unique and idiosyncratic processes of negotiation and link those directly to (1) their 
strategic positioning, i.e. what they are, what they aim to do, and the environment in which 
they evolve, and (2) their strategy’s implementation, i.e. how effectively they implement their 
strategic choices. The case shows the means through which the Irish airline builds its strategic 
success, not only by cutting costs on their flying operations, but also rather through a structured 
negotiation approach towards all of their key stakeholders (Figure 1).  
So far, most explanations of Ryanair’s success have centered on its cost-killing appetite. 
It is therefore interesting to note that the Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2010) simplified 
business model for Ryanair does not take into account the underlying importance of negotiation 
in all aspects of their business model. Indeed, Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, consistently with 
the mainstream approach of strategy scholars to negotiation, included the aspect of having 
tough negotiators in their model in order to support Ryanair’s bargaining power. They do not, 
however, offer any explanation of such activity (i.e. the word negotiation is never used in their 
article). Conversely, we deem it to be key to the firm’s success. It is our claim that cost-killing 
does not suffice to explain why the figures published by other European low-cost carriers are 
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so far lower than Ryanair’s, although these direct competitors rely on similar business recipes. 
Seeing as Ryanair is more profitable than the other European low-cost carriers by a significant 
margin, to the exception of EasyJet’s most recent results, they must have something more than 
the competition. We argue that their ability to structure their negotiation practices with all of 
their stakeholders, not only a few of them, stands at the roots of their strategic success. This is 
where, as we will demonstrate in subsequent sections, our current strategic perspective on 
negotiation prevents us from fully understanding this phenomenon. 
5.1. The circularity between strategy and negotiation 
So far, in the field of strategy, negotiations have been mostly treated as a pure 
implementation tool, i.e. within the management practice (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 
2006; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003; Luo and Shenkar, 2002). Figure 2, in its upper section, 
shows the static assumption of the literature. However, as the Ryanair case exemplifies, we 
suggest considering the relationship between strategy and negotiation as a dynamic cycle. In 
this, negotiation and strategy self-reinforce each other. For example, is Ryanair negotiating 
consistently because of its strategy and its positioning, or is Ryanair’s negotiation capability 
allowing them to deploy their strategy and maintain their positioning? Unpacking this model 
requires looking at the contribution of negotiation to strategy, looking at the reverse 
relationship, and finally fitting negotiation within the definition of an organizational capability. 
 
Figure 2 – Circularity between strategy and negotiation 
  
Negotiation practices contribute to strategy formulation and implementation. With no 
intention to forget other factors affecting strategic success (Grant, 2010), negotiation 
effectiveness may differentiate between the organizations that will thrive and those that will 
fail, no matter how good their strategy looks on paper (Mintzberg, 1994). Reading Mintzberg 
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through a negotiation lens leads the reader to wonder at to what extent social dialogue, 
employee participation mechanisms and, more generally, negotiation practices within an 
organization may impact not only strategy formulation but also implementation. Such 
reasoning truly puts negotiation at the heart of the strategy process. 
Conversely, individuals rarely negotiate for themselves but, instead, act on behalf of 
their team, department, business unit, or entire organization. Negotiation research clearly 
establishes that people negotiate differently depending on the organization they serve, which 
determines their role in the negotiation (Appelt and Higgins, 2010; McCracken et al., 2011). 
For example, Ryanair’s explicit strategy allows negotiators to exhort more competitive 
behaviors when negotiating with local airports than classical airlines would do, as the threat of 
leaving the airport is high (Quote 4). Similarly, the same airport would not grant the same 
conditions to another airline.  
By approaching the argument from a strategy perspective, this leads us to think about 
the influence of an organization's strategy and the strategic positioning of its agents’ 
negotiation practices and negotiation effectiveness. However, this leaves unresolved the 
question of which strategy variables may fuel this circular relationship. We believe that there 
may be a number of these variables impacting the way people negotiate for the organization.  
5.2. Viewing negotiation as an organizational capability 
We argue that to exploit full benefits from this circular relationship, organizations may 
be wise to develop a true negotiation capability. This idea was first expressed by negotiation 
scholars tied to the Harvard’s well-known Program on Negotiation (PON), namely Ertel (1999) 
and later Movius and Susskind (2009). In alignment with these two sources, we argue for a 
management approach to negotiation that takes an organization-wide perspective, i.e. looks at 
all negotiated exchanges at once, rather than one negotiation at a time. 
 In defining negotiation as a capability, we suggest integrating the negotiation literature 
with concepts drawn from the resource-based view theory (RBV), specifically the notion of 
dynamic capability (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Laaksonen and 
Peltoniemi, 2018; Teece and Pisano, 1994). RBV seeks to understand how competitive 
advantage is created and sustained over time, by focusing on the internal organization of firms 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). The underlying assumption of RBV is the conceptualization of firms as 
agglomerations of resources, which are heterogeneously distributed across firms and their 
capabilities. Scholars in this stream of theory argue that competitive advantage can be achieved 
and sustained if the firm possesses, through development or acquisition, resources that are 
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valuable, inimitable, rare, and non-substitutable. This allows the firm to implement value-
creating and difficult-to-duplicate strategies (Allred et al., 2011). Teece and colleagues (1997) 
have integrated dynamism into RBV, pointing out that most environments in which firms 
compete are dynamic in the sense that the industry structure evolves at different speeds.  
In their seminal article, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) claimed that dynamic capabilities 
actually consist of the identifiable and specific routines that put resources into use. Some 
dynamic capabilities integrate resources, such as product development routines (e.g. Toyota). 
Strategic decision-making is considered to be a dynamic capability in which “managers pool 
their various business, functional, and personal expertise to make the choices that shape the 
major strategic moves of the firm” (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Emerging from path-
dependent histories of individual firms, dynamic capabilities are characterized as unique and 
idiosyncratic processes (Teece et al., 1997), although dynamic capabilities also exhibit 
common features that are associated with effective processes across firms (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000). With no intention to enter the debate about the definition of capabilities (a recent 
review of the dynamic capability concept may be found in Laaksonen and Peltoniemi, 2018), 
for the purpose of our research we support Eisenhardt and Martin’s definition of dynamic 
capabilities: “the firm’s processes that use resources – specifically the processes to integrate, 
reconfigure, gain, and release resources – to match and even create market change. Dynamic 
capabilities, thus, are the organizational and strategic routines by which firms achieve new 
resource configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die” (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000, p. 1107).  
This enables us to define negotiation, from an organizational and strategic perspective, 
as a joint decision-making process (Lax and Sebenius, 1986) that is required in any 
organization to (1) integrate, e.g. joint ventures (Brouthers and Bamossy, 1997), mergers and 
acquisitions (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Dierickx and Koza, 1991) or interdepartmental 
exchange (Nauta and Sanders, 2000); (2) reconfigure, e.g.  relationships with subsidiaries (Pahl 
and Roth, 1993; Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2006) or in strategic decision-making teams 
(Parayitam and Dooley, 2011); and (3) gain and release resources, e.g. sales and purchasing.  
In other words, it allows us to define negotiation as a dynamic capability. 
We propose that such a negotiation capability is determinant for the firm’s competitive 
advantage which, for example, differentiates Ryanair from its competitors, who largely lag 
behind in terms of profitability. Our analysis of Ryanair’s success can be systematized by using 
Eisenhardt and Martin’s (2000) model of dynamic capabilities (Table 2). 
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Table 2 – Application of Eisenhardt and Martin’s framework to the Negotiation Capability of Ryanair (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000) 
 Eisenhardt and Martin’s 
conceptualization of dynamic 
capabilities 
Ryanair’s Negotiation capability 
Definition Specific organizational and strategic 
processes by which managers alter their 
resource base. 
Ryanair shows specific organizational and strategic 
processes within its negotiations. 
Heterogeneity Commonalities (i.e. best practice) with 
some idiosyncratic details. 
Ryanair masters largely common negotiation 
strategies and tactics (e.g. take-it-or-leave-it) in an 
idiosyncratic fashion that exploits its market 
dominance. 
Pattern Depending on market dynamism, 
ranging from detailed, analytic routines 
to simple, experiential ones. 
Ryanair adapts negotiation behaviors to specific 
markets and stakeholders. 
Outcome Depending on market dynamism, 
predictable or unpredictable. 
Negotiation outcome depends on market dynamism, 
predictable or unpredictable. 
Competitive 
Advantage 
Competitive advantage from valuable, 
somewhat rare, equifinal, substitutable, 
and fungible dynamic capabilities. 
Ryanair’s negotiation capability is a fundamental 
contribution to its competitive advantage. 
Evolution Unique path shaped by learning 
mechanisms such as practice, 
codification, mistakes, and pacing. 
Ryanair’s negotiation capability has evolved over 
time, taking advantage of external changes (e.g. the 
1997 deregulation of the market) and adapting to its 
growing market dominance. 
 
We know that a dynamic capability has to take on the form of a “specific organizational 
and strategic process by which managers alter their resource base” (Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000). By analyzing Ryanair’s negotiation behaviors, we can infer that negotiation for them is 
a specific process, largely adopted to alter their resource base (e.g., airport slots, airplanes, 
employee contracts, etc.). As we have argued, negotiation is a process (Zartman, 1977) 
centered on trade-offs broader than only the exchange of goods and services. In the words of 
Quélin and Duhamel, managers “should be able both to conduct negotiations for large scale 
contracts and provide guidelines for their businesses. In particular, they should be able to 
provide framework contracts to ensure a high level of consistency and cohesiveness in their 
organizations” (Quélin and Duhamel, 2003).  
A second aspect of dynamic capabilities is that a firm demonstrating a dynamic 
capability shares commonalities, or best practices, with other firms in its industry, but also 
shows idiosyncratic details which make the analyzed firm different from the rest of its industry. 
Ryanair is an example of a firm with a successful, yet idiosyncratic, negotiating capability. 
They use largely known negotiation tactics, such as their ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ approach and 
information leaking, in an idiosyncratic fashion. 
Thirdly, the pattern of effective dynamic capabilities is influenced by market 
dynamism. The pattern of negotiation capability shows the same dependence on market 
conditions. Indeed, Ryanair alternates the use of standardized negotiation practices to one-time 
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experiences based on market dynamism and stakeholder characteristics. The negotiation 
capability relies, in some cases, on structured routines based on pre-existing knowledge 
(Kesting and Smolinski, 2007); in others, it will evolve through trial and error, simple, and 
experiential events. In such markets, pre-existing knowledge and experience may harm 
negotiation (Moran and Ritov, 2007), which makes the use of negotiation routines difficult.  
Fourthly, the outcome of a capability follows the same general path as the pattern of 
the capability. In less dynamic markets, where negotiation capabilities are structured through 
routines and systems that allow less freedom of movement to the negotiators, the outcome of 
negotiations can be considered more predictable (Adair and Brett, 2005). Conversely, in highly 
dynamic markets, where emergent patterns of negotiation capability rely less on routines and 
more on experience, the outcome of negotiations is more difficult to predict (Lax and Sebenius, 
1986). 
In terms of contribution to competitive advantage, we have described the ways in which 
Ryanair’s negotiation capability drives and sustains its competitive advantage. Competitive 
advantage is achieved through the possession of valuable resources for specific use, and 
additional value can be generated by combining the original resources of the firm with those 
of other firms (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003). Is negotiation a capability, able to bring 
competitive advantage if used appropriately? In Lippman and Rumelt's words: “in such a 
resource assembly, skill at bargaining and negotiation would further enhance value creation” 
(2003, p. 1082).  
Finally, the negotiation capability has elements of an evolutionary process that follow 
a unique path, shaped by learning and experience. Although we have neglected to present a full 
longitudinal analysis of Ryanair’s negotiation practices, their negotiation behaviors have 
changed and evolved over their history. Despite on-going controversies in negotiation theory 
about the exact role of learning and experience in increasing negotiation performance (Caputo, 
2013), the body of research, nonetheless, shows that individual negotiation ability is definitely 
shaped by learning and experience (Ness and Haugland, 2005). One might not become a better 
negotiator over time, but ability in negotiation is a function of previous engagements. 
Negotiation could therefore be considered to be a dynamic capability of the firm. 
Despite the scarcity of references shedding direct light on this issue, negotiation appears 
to play the role of a capability within a firm or an organization; more precisely, a dynamic 
capability, in the sense of Eisenhardt and Martin (2000). This leads us to present some 
operational advice, as well as some suggestions for future research. 
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5.3 Theoretical and practical implications: creating a negotiation capability 
Saying that negotiation should be considered an organizational capability is one thing; 
let us now attempt to explain how such a capability may be created and nurtured. Both Ertel 
(1999) and Movius and Susskind (2009) start with the idea that putting managers through 
classical negotiation training does not suffice to increase the organization’s overall efficiency 
at negotiating in both a durable and substantial manner - it is a necessary, yet not sufficient, 
first step. Rather, they suggest a full audit of current negotiation practices, then a series of 
change efforts that rely on innovation diffusion (e.g., tailor-made training programs, analysis 
of practice, experience exchanges among practitioners, etc.) and adaptation and standardization 
of processes, such as the adoption of a unique negotiation preparation instrument (see for 
example Bell and Mandell, 2018). They also offer a range of reflections pertaining to aligning 
the negotiators’ incentive structure with the organization’s strategic goals (Movius and 
Susskind, 2009).  
Going further, Ertel (1999) suggests adopting a different perspective on negotiation 
altogether, moving away from a situational approach to a more systematic and integrated one. 
He advocates coordinating all negotiations, not by creating stricter rules or mandates for 
negotiators, but instead by creating an exchange platform to support reports on all negotiations 
and exchange good practices, in addition to changing the incentive structure to better align the 
negotiators’ objectives with the strategic goals they serve. To ensure that negotiators actually 
use their organization’s strengths and act in the direction of the stated objectives requires a 
carefully crafted set of incentives and controls. For this, negotiators need to understand what 
their organization strategy is and have it tied to their objectives and bonus schemes.  
Negotiation efficiency, defined as serving best the organization’s objectives, may 
therefore involve innovative management control and human resource practices induced by the 
strategic forces of the firm. This could apply to a few functions of the firm (management, sales, 
HR, etc.) or, better, to the entire organization. The organization could then, much like Ryanair, 
benefit from increased coherence in their negotiation practices. Negotiation is thus a 
management issue which requires careful management practices. For example, some functions 
may have tools that could be used elsewhere; e.g. salespeople have periodic reviews of their 
negotiation practices, sometimes with a more experienced peer shadowing them in their 
interactions with a customer. Such insight into how they negotiate (and not the results they 
achieve) could be usefully transposed to social dialogue experts, or managers giving yearly 
evaluations to their subordinates. 
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We propose adoption of the concept of “negotiation infrastructure” to describe all of 
the possible levers an organization has at its disposal to ensure its agents negotiate along the 
lines of its strategic objectives. Compiling an entire list of such levers is a complex task that 
remains to be tackled; this article only mentions a few. By this, we infer that an organization 
that considers its negotiations from a systemic perspective – and acts upon it – may through 
these means find some sources of performance. In other words, similarly to innovation, 
negotiation, seen and nurtured as a strategic capability, has the propensity to help firms unleash 
themselves from structural market constraints and support their competitive advantage (e.g., 
Natalicchio et al., 2017). Therefore, a systemic approach to negotiation should help 
organizations better achieve their strategic objectives.  
All of this requires considering negotiation not from the sole perspective of behaviors 
(what happens at the negotiation tables), but through a strategic and managerial approach. 
Support for an integrated and systematic approach to negotiation from an academic perspective 
may be philosophically grounded in the studies of Zartman in terms of political negotiations 
(see for example, Ramsbotham and Schiff, 2018). Traditionally, negotiations have been 
approached through two mutually-exclusive lenses: mostly a behavioral one examining the 
human interactions at and around the negotiation table, with little concern for what is being 
negotiated; the other looking at the context of particular types of negotiations, such as 
employment relations (Stimec, 2014). The issue is that each approach is an unopened black 
box for the other one: the behavioral prism does not care about the context, nor the sources of 
complexity, of real-life negotiations, while the contextual approach does not look at the 
negotiations’ behavioral elements. Zartman has long defended an integrated research approach 
that would combine behaviors and processes, which he materialized around a series of case 
studies drawn from complex geopolitical negotiations (Zartman, 1988). Such a philosophy 
would enable us to look at the entire corpus of negotiations an organization may experience, 
as one negotiation serves as the context for another one, but this has yet to transpire into 
business research. Zartman’s approach supports the idea that negotiation can – and should – be 
approached in its entirety. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The Ryanair case study enabled us to show the clear link between performance in 
negotiation and the creation and sustainment of competitive advantage. At the same time, it 
clearly shows that what Ryanair achieves in negotiation would not be possible without the 
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position the airline enjoys as a market leader. With this paper, we advance theory by providing 
an explanation as to why, under unfavorable market conditions and a business model that 
should not favor its bargaining power (e.g. suppliers in the case of the airline industry), some 
firms (e.g. Ryanair) can thrive and be successful by taking advantage of the structural 
weaknesses of their industry. The Ryanair case shows how a firm mastering negotiation as an 
organizational capability can turn the power relationship with its stakeholders into their own 
advantage. Our study proposes a model that shows the possibly reciprocal relationship between 
strategy and negotiation, as negotiation practices are influenced by the organization’s strategy 
and, in turn, play a large role in strategy making, leading to competitive advantage. We have 
demonstrated that this circular relationship is fueled by some strategic variables and that the 
resulting capability may be nurtured by multiple management tools. However, our study, being 
novel and inductive, leaves room for refinement and opens up many questions for future 
research. One of them lies in the fact that success in negotiation is more than a quantitative 
result – “Did I negotiate well or not?” – but requires a subtle fit with the organization’s 
positioning and strategic objectives. This requires a comprehensive categorization of the 
strategic factors that will have an impact on negotiations throughout the organization.  
By no means do we want to support “a way” of negotiating, such as the hard bargaining 
of Ryanair; we rather propose that an organization that structures and nurtures a unique and 
idiosyncratic negotiation style could increase its chance of success and obtain a competitive 
advantage. We believe that what makes Ryanair successful is its harmonization and coherence 
in negotiating, aligned with the strategy of the firm, rather than a specific tactic. We also warn 
about a potentially dark side of negotiation capability, when interpreted as a way of extortion 
and abuse of power. Unfortunately, many business and political cases have reminded the world 
about the existence of this ‘dark force’. Nevertheless, we suggest that a firm that negotiates to 
harm society and its stakeholders will not sustain its competitive advantage for long. Such 
ethical concerns are not the focus of our paper; however, future research might find profitable 
streams in bridging our theory with business ethics. For example, how long can Ryanair keep 
its negotiation style as it is, rather than go for a more relational and long-term approach? What 
are the externalities of such negotiation strategies, for example with reference to employee 
relations? The negotiation capability will need to evolve with the organization and its 
environment (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003).  
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6.1 Future research directions and limitations 
Several future research directions may lie in the advancement of research efforts related 
to the circular relationship between strategy and negotiation, in which several variables may 
have a role. A first variable that may impact the circularity between strategy and negotiation 
could be the market power. In the analysis of corporate behavior, when the literature in strategy 
refers to the concept of bargaining power (Porter, 1980), it does so mostly from an industrial 
economics perspective (Kim, 1988; Michael, 2000; Moatti et al., 2014). Such studies do not 
exactly tackle the issue of how organizations negotiate based on their bargaining power and 
that of their counterparts’. For example, according to this view, Ryanair should not have held 
the power that it had over Boeing, the unique possible supplier for its aircraft. 
The characteristics of the market may also play an important role. People would 
certainly not negotiate in the same way with a firm enjoying a monopoly, or a strong 
oligopolistic situation, as with a firm dealing with a perfect competition setting (Machlup and 
Taber, 1960). This also applies to employers on specific markets, such as Ryanair for pilots, 
which may be the only ones recruiting in a specific region. Similarly, negotiators may have to 
select a different strategy depending on whether competition takes place with regards to price 
or to product or service characteristics. One may, therefore, posit that there are strong links 
between the market environment and the way that agents, on the ground, interact with the 
organization’s stakeholders. 
Similarly, we know little about what distinguishes a particularly innovative firm from 
its peers when negotiating with key stakeholders (e.g., Del Giudice et al., 2014). A firm that 
offers unique products or services may, just like a firm controlling rare resources, set its 
conditions to its clients, no matter how big and powerful they are. This may be more difficult 
to achieve for firms offering standard, substitutable products or services, which can only 
compete on price or secondary variables (such as geographic proximity). Thi has been 
established through a consolidate stream of research in strategy (Grant, 2010), which focuses 
mainly on demonstrating such dynamics and relationships rather than on explaining how, at an 
organizational level, those activities are performed. We therefore assume that relationships – 
both internal and external, i.e. not only commercial but also, for example, employment relations 
– may be built on completely different grounds depending on the innovative nature of the firm, 
leading to systematically different negotiation practices.  
Likewise, we may posit that one will not negotiate in the same way with a young firm 
– say, a start-up venture – as opposed to a well-established firm. We know that, for example, 
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managers and entrepreneurs differ in their strategic decision-making processes according to 
the dimension and history of their organization (Busenitz and Barney, 1997). Similarly, the 
clients’ dimension affects the auditors’ behavior (Reynolds and Francis, 2000). Moreover, we 
know that contextual variables, such as a firm’s relative competitive position in the market, 
influence the choice of negotiation behaviors of purchasing agents (Perdue and Summers, 
1991). Beyond the question of size and, consequently, power, there may be a lifecycle 
argument (Mueller, 1972). Following a lifecycle approach, the introductory and rising phases 
may lead to different negotiation strategies than the maturity and decline phases (Helfat and 
Peteraf, 2003). In the former, it is about penetrating the market and potentially accepting 
suboptimal conditions, just to ‘get out there’. As the product gains traction, the firm may set 
more stringent conditions to its clients, which is difficult to do for the early adopters, as they 
may not understand why the initial, more favorable terms are not renewed (Rink and Swan, 
1979; Anderson and Zeithaml, 1984). Finally, in the decline phase, it may be about milking the 
cow one last time, with little consideration for the long-term relationship. 
We also propose that the level of ambition of one’s strategy may impact its negotiated 
processes, particularly the internal ones; a relationship mediated by the size and level of 
structuration of the organization (Welbourne and Pardo-del-Val, 2009). Simply put, a large, 
bureaucratic organization trying to completely turn itself around may harm its relationships 
with its key stakeholders, generating conflict and hardship for negotiators, for example, on the 
Human Resources’ side of things (Beatty and Schneier, 1997). Conversely, a young and agile 
SME may more easily implement similar change and gain acceptance from its stakeholders 
(e.g., employees, financial backers, suppliers, and clients). 
Future research might also focus on comparing the Ryanair experience with other 
successfully negotiating firms, in order to unveil common features associated with the best 
negotiating practices. Failure cases may also cast an interesting light on our research question. 
Let us consider the example of an event that took place in Air France, the French national air 
carrier. Like many others, Air France wanted to set up and develop a low cost subsidiary, to 
better compete with low cost carriers, such as Ryanair. However, the board’s plan to develop 
Transavia, put forward in September 2014, described as the only way to address competition, 
was stalemated because of failed negotiations with the pilot unions (Clark, 2014). Air France 
may be successful in negotiating with some of its stakeholders, but its inability to push change 
through its unions may cripple its future strategic plans. 
A limitation of our study is indeed its reliance on a single case. However, as explained 
in the research design section, in many occasions theory is built based on single cases that are 
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particularly good at illuminating constructs when under investigation (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007). Future efforts in comparing cases will not only serve our understanding of 
negotiation, but also give us a more pragmatic vision of strategy making as a whole. For 
example, our research can help future research in the Strategy-as-Practice field of study (e.g., 
Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009; Jarzabkowski and Whittington, 2008; Whittington, 1996), with 
such questions as: what is negotiation’s contribution to strategizing? How can negotiation be 
positioned within the praxis, practitioners, and practices framework?  
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